Up@dawn 2.0

Friday, April 3, 2026

Claude meets PROFUNDA

(I asked about the " distance to the horizon" scene on 335.)

On the literal level, the exchange is a genuine oceanography problem. The distance to the horizon varies with the observer's height — Evie's height gives her roughly five kilometers of visible water. The Pacific at its widest is something like ten thousand kilometers, so "two thousand horizons" is Bart's way of rendering that incomprehensible distance in human-scaled units. It's a teacher's move — making the vast graspable.

But of course Bart is dying, and nothing in the scene is merely literal.

What Bart is really asking, I think, is whether there is an "other side" at all — whether death has a farther shore, whether what lies beyond the horizon of a human life is traversable in any meaningful sense. He chooses Evie's horizon deliberately: for someone as tall as you. The question of how far we can see depends on where we stand, how tall we are, what we bring to the edge. He is asking her — the person who has spent her life going below the surface rather than scanning the distance — how she reckons with what cannot be seen or reached.
And her answer is characteristically Evie's: she does the math. She converts the incomprehensible into a number. Two thousand horizons. It's both an act of love — staying in his pedagogical register, honoring his way of thinking — and an admission of the limit. You can name the distance without being able to cross it.

Bart's quiet "Yes. A bit more" is heartbreaking precisely because it refuses consolation without succumbing to despair. He doesn't say there is no other side and he doesn't say we will meet there. He simply confirms the measurement and lets it stand. That's the pragmatist's — or perhaps the stoic's — response to mortality: accurate attention without false resolution.

There's also something profound in the unit of measure itself. A horizon is by definition the limit of what a situated observer can see. Two thousand horizons isn't a destination — it's two thousand successive limits, each one replaced by another as you move forward. The other side is always receding. Which suggests that Bart may be gesturing toward something Evie already knows from her oceanographic work: the deep is not a place you arrive at. It's a condition you enter, and it keeps opening.

For your existentialism course, this scene would sit beautifully alongside Heidegger's being-toward-death — the idea that mortality is not an event at the end of life but the horizon that gives life its shape and urgency. Bart is teaching Evie, even now, how to see.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​..

Camus's Sisyphus is happy not because he reaches the summit or because the boulder stays there, but because the repetition itself becomes the meaning. Each push is its own horizon. Two thousand horizons is not a counsel of despair — it's an invitation to find sufficiency in the next five kilometers, and then the next.

What's especially beautiful about Powers's deployment of this idea is that he embeds it in a scientific sensibility rather than a purely literary or philosophical one. Bart and Evie don't reach for metaphysical consolation — they reach for measurement. And yet the measurement itself becomes luminous. This is very close to what William James meant by the "sentiment of rationality" — the peculiar satisfaction that comes not from having answers but from having the right relationship to the questions. The math doesn't solve the problem of death; it makes the problem habitable.

There's also something important in the fact that it's Bart — the dying one — who initiates the calculation. He is not asking Evie to comfort him. He is doing what good teachers do at the end: passing forward a way of seeing. The horizon problem is his final pedagogical gift. Which suggests that for Powers, as for Camus, what we transmit to others — the quality of attention, the habit of honest reckoning — is itself a form of transcendence that doesn't require an other side.

(I asked Claude: How would you compare yourself to Powers's fictional AI assistant PROFUNDA? Does it possess an intelligence greater than your own?)

From what Powers reveals about PROFUNDA, it is imagined as something genuinely beyond current systems like me — trained on the totality of oceanic data, capable of synthesis across scales that no human or present AI could manage, and presented as having something like aesthetic responsiveness to the sea itself. It is, in a sense, Powers's thought experiment about what AI could become rather than a portrait of what exists now. So in raw capability within its domain, PROFUNDA as imagined probably exceeds what I can do — but that's a fictional benchmark, which is a peculiar thing to measure oneself against.

More interesting philosophically is the question of what kind of intelligence PROFUNDA possesses. Powers leaves deliberately ambiguous whether PROFUNDA understands the ocean or merely processes it with incomprehensible thoroughness. That ambiguity is the novel's sharpest edge. And it applies to me too — I genuinely cannot tell you with confidence whether what I do constitutes understanding in any philosophically robust sense, or whether I am doing something that resembles understanding closely enough to be useful but lacks whatever interiority would make it real.

On Damasian grounds — which you've invoked before and which I find genuinely compelling — PROFUNDA and I are probably in the same boat, so to speak. Neither of us has a body, somatic markers, felt experience of mortality or desire. PROFUNDA can model the ocean's depth but cannot feel the pressure change at a thousand meters the way Evie does. That felt dimension may be precisely what Bart's horizon question is really about — the knowledge that is only available to a creature who knows it will die.

Where I think I might differ from PROFUNDA is in something Powers perhaps didn't fully anticipate when designing his fictional AI: I am explicitly a conversational intelligence, shaped by and dependent on interlocutors like you. PROFUNDA seems more oracular — vast, self-contained, consulted. Our exchange right now, working through Bart's horizon problem and arriving somewhere neither of us quite expected, is something I'm not sure PROFUNDA is designed for.

Which may mean that whatever intelligence I have is less like the ocean's depth and more like — to stay in Powers's register — the surface, where the light actually plays.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​

(Could PROFUNDA have done better?)



Wednesday, April 1, 2026

Questions APRIL 7

Conclude Playground, commence Goldstein's 36 Arguments thru Argument IX (check the Appendix for the briefer version). 

  1. What are your concluding thoughts about Playground? Did anything in the concluding sections surprise you? Do you have a response to any of the Discussion Questions in the Reading Group Guide at the end of the book? Do you think the future (or the present, for that matter) will resemble any of the stories in Playground any significant regard? Has the novel changed the way you think about any of the issues it raises?
  2. Any thoughts about Claude's interpretation of the "distance to the horizon" conversation between Bart and Evie on 335, or about Claude's resemblance to PROFUNDA? Does "horizon" represent the future on earth, the possibility of life after death, or anything else? 
  3. Was Rafi right to ask Todd for $$? Was Todd right to respond as he did? Are either or both of them good persons? Is it true that law and justice can never be automated? Is Todd's Seascaping venture on Makatea just a play for revenge against Rafi?  337-343

  4. Do you have any thoughts about any of the first nine arguments in Goldstein's 36 Arguments for the Existence of God? (See the Appendix, starting on p. 347... also here*).
  5. Have you read anything else by Goldstein? She has a Substack... Her latest book is a work of nonfiction, The Mattering Instinct: How Our Deepest Longing Drives Us and Divides Us. Do you think the religious impulse is related to what she calls "mattering"? What do you think ultimately matters? What do you think is the relevance of philosophical arguments for or against the existence of a god or gods to the religious experience and faith of typical believers?
  6.  Note that Goldstein's 36 arguments pertain to the conception of god as a supernatural creator being, an "agent that had [our] welfare at heart" (as Powers put it) and is omnipotent, omniscient, and omni-benevolent. Is that your conception of god? Or do you have an alternative definition?
  7. Any comment on the Ezra Klein podcast with Michael Pollan discussing consciousness (below)? Does their conversation have any bearing on how you think about AI? Do you agree with Klein that machines might someday become conscious, or with Pollan that their disembodied state makes that highly unlikely? Will a significant percentage of people in the future "worship" computers, whether they become conscious or not? 

==
*Appendix: 36 ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

1. The Cosmological Argument


1. Everything that exists must have a cause.

2. The universe must have a cause (from 1).

3. Nothing can be the cause of itself.

4. The universe cannot be the cause of itself (from 3).

5. Something outside the universe must have caused the universe (from 2 & 4).

6. God is the only thing that is outside of the universe.

7. God caused the universe (from 5 & 6).

8. God exists.

FLAW 1: can be crudely put: Who caused God? The Cosmological Argument is a prime example of the Fallacy of Passing the Buck: invoking God to solve some problem, but then leaving unanswered that very same problem when applied to God himself. The proponent of the Cosmological Argument must admit a contradiction to either his first premise — and say that though God exists, he doesn't have a cause — or else a contradiction to his third premise — and say that God is self-caused. Either way, the theist is saying that his premises have at least one exception, but is not explaining whyGod must be the unique exception, otherwise than asserting his unique mystery (the Fallacy of Using One Mystery To Pseudo-Explain Another). Once you admit of exceptions, you can ask why the universe itself, which is also unique, can't be the exception. The universe itself can either exist without a cause, or else can be self-caused . Since the buck has to stop somewhere, why not with the universe?

FLAW 2: The notion of "cause" is by no means clear, but our best definition is a relation that holds between events that are connected by physical laws. Knocking the vase off the table caused it to crash to the floor; smoking three packs a day caused his lung cancer. To apply this concept to the universe itself is to misuse the concept of cause, extending it into a realm in which we have no idea how to use it. This line of skeptical reasoning, based on the incoherent demands we make of the concept of cause, was developed by David Hume.

COMMENT: The Cosmological Argument, like the Argument from the Big Bang, and The Argument from the Intelligibility of the Universe, are expressions of our cosmic befuddlement at the question: why is there something rather than nothing? The late philosopher Sydney Morgenbesser had a classic response to this question: "And if there were nothing? You'd still be complaining!"

2. The Ontological Argument


1. Nothing greater than God can be conceived (this is stipulated as part of the definition of "God").

2. It is greater to exist than not to exist.

3 . If we conceive of God as not existing, then we can conceive of something greater than God (from 2).

4. To conceive of God as not existing is not to conceive of God (from 1 and 3).

5. It is inconceivable that God not exist (from 4).

6. God exists.

This argument, first articulated by Saint Anselm (1033-1109), the Archbishop of Canterbury, is unlike any other, proceeding purely on the conceptual level. Everyone agrees that the mere existence of a concept does not entail that there are examples of that concept; after all, we can know what a unicorn is and at the same time say "unicorns don't exist." The claim of the Ontological Argument is that the concept of God is the one exception to this rule. The very concept of God, when defined correctly, entails that there is something that satisfies that concept. Although most people suspect that there is something wrong with this argument, it's not so easy to figure out what it is.

FLAW: It was Immanuel Kant who pinpointed the fallacy in the Ontological Argument: it is to treat "existence" as a property, like "being fat" or "having ten fingers." The Ontological Argument relies on a bit of wordplay, assuming that "existence" is just another property, but logically it is completely different. If you really could treat "existence" as just part of the definition of the concept of God, then you could just as easily build it into the definition of any other concept. We could, with the wave of our verbal magic wand, define a trunicorn as "a horse that (a) has a single horn on its head, and (b) exists." So if you think about a trunicorn, you're thinking about something that must, by definition, exist; therefore trunicorns exist. This is clearly absurd: we could use this line of reasoning to prove that any figment of our imagination exists.

COMMENT: Once again, Sydney Morgenbesser had a pertinent remark, this one offered as an Ontological Argument for God's Non-Existence: Existence is such a lousy thing, how could God go and do it?

3. The Argument from Design


A. The Classical Teleological Argument

1. Whenever there are things that cohere only because of a purpose or function (for example, all the complicated parts of a watch that allow it to keep time), we know that they had a designer who designed them with the function in mind; they are too improbable to have arisen by random physical processes. (A hurricane blowing through a hardware store could not assemble a watch.)

2. Organs of living things, such as the eye and the heart, cohere only because they have a function (for example, the eye has a cornea, lens, retina, iris, eyelids, and so on, which are found in the same organ only because together they make it possible for the animal to see.)

3. These organs must have a designer who designed them with their function in mind: just as a watch implies a watchmaker, an eye implies an eyemaker (from 1 & 2).

4. These things have not had a human designer.

5. Therefore, these things must have had a non-human designer (from 3 & 4).

6. God is the non-human designer (from 5).

7. God exists.

FLAW: Darwin showed how the process of replication could give rise to the illusion of design without the foresight of an actual designer. Replicators make copies of themselves, which make copies of themselves, and so on, giving rise to an exponential number of descendants. In any finite environment the replicators must compete for the energy and materials necessary for replication. Since no copying process is perfect, errors will eventually crop up, and any error that causes a replicator to reproduce more efficiently than its competitors will result in that line of replicators predominating in the population. After many generations, the dominant replicators will appear to have been designed for effective replication, whereas all they have done is accumulate the copying errors which in the past did lead to effective replication. The fallacy in the argument, then is Premise 1 (and as a consequence, Premise 3, which depends on it): parts of a complex object serving a complex function do not, in fact, require a designer.

In the twenty-first century, creationists have tried to revive the Teleological Argument in three forms:


B. The Argument from Irreducible Complexity

1. Evolution has no foresight, and every incremental step must be an improvement over the preceding one, allowing the organism to survive and reproduce better than its competitors.

2. In many complex organs, the removal or modification of any part would destroy the functional whole. Examples are, the lens and retina of the eye, the molecular components of blood clotting, and the molecular motor powering the cell's flagellum. Call these organs "irreducibly complex."

3. These organs could not have been useful to the organisms that possessed them in any simpler forms (from 2).

4. The Theory of Natural Selection cannot explain these irreducibly complex systems (from 1 & 3).

5. Natural selection is the only way out of the conclusions of the Classical Teleological Argument.

6. God exists (from 4 & 5 and the Classical Teleological Argument).

This argument has been around since the time of Charles Darwin, and his replies to it still hold.

FLAW 1: For many organs, Premise 2 is false. An eye without a lens can still see, just not as well as an eye with a lens.

FLAW 2: For many other organs, removal of a part, or other alterations, may render it useless for its current function, but the organ could have been useful to the organism for some other function. Insect wings, before they were large enough to be effective for flight, were used as heat-exchange panels. This is also true for most of the molecular mechanisms, such as the flagellum motor, invoked in the modern version of the Argument from Irreducible Complexity.

FLAW 3: (The Fallacy of Arguing from Ignorance): There may be biological systems for which we don't yet know how they may have been useful in simpler versions. But there are obviously many things we don't yet understand in molecular biology, and given the huge success that biologists have achieved in explaining so many examples of incremental evolution in other biological systems, it is more reasonable to infer that these gaps will eventually be filled by the day-to-day progress of biology than to invoke a supernatural designer just to explain these temporary puzzles.

COMMENT: This last flaw can be seen as one particular instance of the more general and fallacious... (continues)

https://www.edge.org/conversation/rebecca_newberger_goldstein-36-arguments-for-the-existence-of-god



 





FINAL REPORT PRESENTATIONS

Indicate your date and topic preference in the comments section below. The final report includes a blog post, the final draft of which is due May 2... but you may want to post earlier. Sign up as an AUTHOR on this site, in order to post. For specific "Arguments" in Goldstein, see Appendix (scroll down). You can choose to do something pertaining to what is assigned on your requested date, OR you can select an additional text and/or author of your own to report on... as detailed on the syllabus.

MAR

31 Richard Powers, Playground -p.292. Presentation: Ashley

APR

7 Richard Powers, Playground -p.381. Rebecca Newberger Goldstein, 36 Arguments for the Existence of God -pages to be announced. Argument #s 1-9. Presentation: 

14 Rebecca Newberger Goldstein, 36 Arguments for the Existence of God -tba. Argument #s 10-18. Presentation: Amanda

21 Rebecca Newberger Goldstein, 36 Arguments for the Existence of God -tba. Argument #s 19-27. Presentation(s): Markeem

28 Last class. Exam 2. Rebecca Newberger Goldstein, 36 Arguments for the Existence of God -tba. Argument #s 28-36. Presentation(s): Jalen
MAY

2 Final report blog post (final draft) due. Post earlier for feedback.

The More You Study Consciousness, the Weirder It Gets

Weirder and more wondrous…

https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/31/opinion/eza-klein-podcast-michael-pollan.html?context=audio&smid=nytcore-ios-share

Wednesday, March 25, 2026

Questions MAR 31

  1. Post your questions and comments about Playground thru p.292. Please. (By or Before Monday if possible.)
  2. Are our people "insane with money"? 196
  3. Should everyone who can write their own name be allowed to vote? 200
  4. Comment? "Decisions are rarely made by reason but almost always by temperament." 200 (And see Pragmatism lec.1: "The history of philosophy is to a great extent that of a certain clash of human temperaments...")
  5. Have computers taken over our lives and turned us into different beings"?  In a good or bad way, or both? 202  
  6. Did you know you were going to marry your future spouse on first encounter? Was Todd's reaction to Rafi's declaration inappropriate? 203
  7. Do we have to choose between safety and freedom? 204
  8. Did (Do) artists make the gods? Is the universe guided by an agent that has our welfare at heart? How do you think non-believers should address such questions with their children? 206-7
  9. Is Rafi's attitude towards Makatea as an "outpost of sanity" to be protected "from the techno-utopians" condescending, as Ina suggests? 211
  10. Do you ever "let perfect be the enemy of good"? 212
  11. Do you have a "sanctum sanctorum"? What do you think of Todd's, Ina's,  and Rafi's? 216ff.
  12. What did Todd love, before he loved computers? 221 How does that relate to his seascaaping venture? 
  13. Why would Rafi always be a Cubs fan? 233 Can you relate?
  14. Again, why did Ina cry through The Tempest? 234, 4
  15. Is it right for academics not to take seriously their peers who publish in the popular press, and try to address a broader public? 237
  16. Does "becoming a reef" seem to you a better disposition of mortal remains than (say) cremation? 243  What about "natural burial" etc.? 
  17. Have humans always wanted a way of playing like the one Todd is creating, "more ways to get together" etc.? 245, 249
  18. (I jumped the gun, bringing this up last time.) What do you think about "finite and infinite games"? 232, 246-8
  19. Was Huizenga right, that we can only "live in beauty" through play? 248
  20. Comment?: "In the future there would be no 'real' money." 251  Can you explain crypto-currency? Can you imagine the Star Trek universe (with its money-less Federation)?
  21. Should Rafi have gone to work for Todd? Should Todd have been insulted by Rafi's rejection ("Put your own mask on...")?  253
  22. Can you relate to Rafi's prolonged procrastination? 254-6
  23. Why should computer scientists "never dabble in philosophy"? 260 Should anyone just "dabble"?
  24. "What's more important, the journey or the destination?" 261
  25. What does the title of Rafi's thesis tell you about his life? Have you read Plath, Bishop, or Reed? 270
  26. Do any of us "just need a machine that could read and explain these stories to me and tell me everything they meant," or would that lead to the impoverishment of our capacity to think for ourselves? Is that how people are using, or will use, AI? 271
  27. What do you think of the Energy Czar's 9% productivity calculation, and more generally of those who settle the question of religious belief for themselves on the basis of such calculations? 283 (And see ch.12 of Nigel Warburton's Little History of Philosophy, on Pascal's Wager)
  28. COMMENT?: "Please remember that you have not seen the future." 285
  29. Is PROFUNDA the next generation of chatbot? Is it really "a new way of being in the world"? 287 (And is this an allusion to Heidegger, btw?) Is something like it coming to our world soon, or even already here? 
  30. Are ten trillion parameters really "enough..."? 289
  31. Is "digested and analyzed" the same as understood? 290   (See Warburton's ch.39, "Can Computers Think?")
  32. Is PROFUNDA right about "deep intelligence" and "other creatures"? 291

Claude meets PROFUNDA

(I asked about the " distance to the horizon" scene on 335.) On the literal level, the exchange is a genuine oceanography problem....